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ON SUSTAINABLE EQUILIBRIA
SRIHARI GOVINDAN, RIDA LARAKI, AND LUCAS PAHL
Abstract. Following the ideas laid out in Myerson [13], Hofbauer [8] defined an equilib-
rium of a game as sustainable if it can be made the unique equilibrium of a game obtained by
deleting a subset of the strategies that are inferior replies to it, and then adding others. Hof-
bauer also formalized Myerson’s conjecture about the relationship between the sustainability
of an equilibrium and its index: for a generic class of games, an equilibrium is sustainable
iff its index is +1. Von Schemde and von Stengel [22] proved this conjecture for bimatrix
games. This paper shows that the conjecture is true for all finite games. More precisely,
we prove that an isolated equilibrium of a given game has index +1 if and only if it can be
made unique in a larger game obtained by adding finitely many inferior reply strategies.
1. Introduction
Myerson [13] proposes a refinement of Nash equilibria of finite games, which he calls
sustainable equilibria, based on the hypothesis that most games, even if they are one-shot
affairs, should be analyzed not as if they are played in isolation, but rather as particular
instances of many plays of such games. Myerson argues that when, say, two members of
a society play a Battle-of-Sexes game, if the game has a history in this society, it becomes
a “culturally familiar” game for these two players, and the past history of plays, by other
members of the society, should inform play in this encounter. An equilibrium is then a
cultural norm, an institution, in this society, and the game is typically played according to
this norm. Any Nash equilibrium of the underlying game that can emerge as a norm in
some society is sustainable. From this perspective, Myerson reasons, the two pure-strategy
equilibria in the Battle-of-Sexes game are sustainable while the mixed equilibrium is not.
In his search for a formal definition of a sustainable equilibrium, Myerson considers, and
then dismisses, on axiomatic grounds, existing refinements that yield the same prediction in
the Battle-of-Sexes game as his heuristic argument does: for example, persistent equilibria
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fail invariance; and evolutionary stability fails existence. Myerson concludes his paper with
a conjecture that the index of an equilibrium is a determinant of its sustainability.1
Hofbauer [8] distills the ideas in Myerson’s paper to provide a definition of sustainable
equilibria. Hofbauer posits that a minimum requirement of sustainability should be that if
an equilibrium of a game is sustainable, it should remain sustainable in the game obtained by
restricting players’ strategies to the set of best replies to the equilibrium.2 If one also accepts
that an equilibrium that is unique is sustainable, then one is lead to the following definition.
Say that a game-equilibrium pair is equivalent to another such pair if the restrictions of the
two games to the set of best replies to their respective equilibria are the same game (modulo
a relabelling of the players and their strategies) and the two equilibria coincide (under the
same identification). An equilibrium of a game is sustainable if it has an equivalent pair
where the equilibrium is unique. Call an equilibrium regular if locally the equilibrium is a
differentiable function of the game payoffs (see section 2.1). Following Myerson, Hofbauer
conjectured that a regular equilibrium is sustainable iff its index is +1. Von Stengel and von
Schemde [22] proved this conjecture for bimatrix games. In this paper, we show that the
conjecture holds for all N -person games.
To illustrate the ideas involved, consider the battle of the sexes game G below. It has
three Nash equilibria: two are strict (t, l) and (b, r) (with index +1), and one is mixed (with
index −1).
G =
l r
t (3, 2) (0, 0)
b (0, 0) (2, 3)
By adding one strategy to each player (x for player 1, and y for player 2, see the game Gˆ
below), b and r are now strictly dominated. Removing them yields a game where x and y
are strictly dominated, making the strict equilibrium (t, l) of G the unique equilibrium of Gˆ.
Gˆ =
l r y
t (3, 2) (0, 0) (0, 1)
b (0, 0) (2, 3) (−2, 4)
x (1, 0) (4,−2) (−1,−1)
This construction easily extends to all finite games: any strict equilibrium (necessarily
pure, regular and with index +1, see Ritzberger [17]) can be made the unique equilibrium
1Interestingly, Myerson speculates that one could perhaps develop a theory of index of equilibria based
on fixed-point theory, seemingly unaware, as Hofbauer [8] observes, of an extant theory in the literature (see
Gu¨l, Pearce and Stacchetti [6] and Ritzberger [17]).
2For regular games, this is equivalent to restricting players’ strategies to the support of the equilibrium—
see Section 4 for a discussion of this point.
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in a larger game obtained by adding finitely many inferior reply strategies.3 Our paper
extends this property to mixed equilibria: we prove that any regular equilibrium (and more
generally any isolated equilibrium) of a given game has index +1 if and only if it can be
made the unique equilibrium in a larger game obtained by adding finitely many inferior reply
strategies.
What are the key properties of the index of equilibria that drive this equivalence? To
answer this question, let us see a sketch of our proof. In one direction, suppose that an
equilibrium σ of a game G is sustainable, and that (G, σ) is equivalent to a pair (G¯, σ) where
σ is the unique equilibrium of G¯. Let G∗ be the game obtained from G by deleting strategies
that are inferior replies to σ. It follows from a property of the index that the index of σ in
G can be computed as the index of σ in G∗. The game G∗ is also the game obtained from G¯
by deleting inferior replies there. Therefore, the index of σ in G∗ can also be computed as
the index of σ in G¯. As σ is the unique equilibrium of G¯, its index is +1, which then gives
us the result.
Going the other way, if we have a +1 index equilibrium σ of a game G, and since the sum
of indices over all equilibria is +1, then the sum of the indices of the other equilibria is zero.
Now, we can take a map whose fixed points are the Nash equilibria of G and alter it outside
a neighbourhood of σ so that the new map has no fixed points other than σ.4 By a careful
addition of strategies and specification of payoffs for these strategies, we obtain a game G¯
where any equilibrium must translate into a fixed point of the modified map of G, making
σ the unique equilibrium in G¯.
A word about our methodology is in order. In a bimatrix game, a player’s payoff function
is linear in his opponent’s strategy and the index can easily be computed using the Shapley
formula [19]. Von Schemde and von Stengel [22] were able to exploit those features and
use tools from the theory of polytopes (von Schemde [23]) to prove the conjecture. In the
general case, their technique is inapplicable. What we do, instead, is start with a construction
involving a fixed-point map and then convert it into a game-theoretically meaningful one.
In this respect, our approach is similar in spirit to, but different in details from, that in
Govindan and Wilson [5].
Equilibria with index +1 are also distinguished from their counterparts with index −1 in
terms of their dynamic stability. It is well-known, both in general equilibrium and in game
3To make a strict equilibrium s = (s1, ..., sN ) of a game G unique in a larger game Gˆ, it is enough to add
one strategy xn per player n as in the Battle-of-Sexes, where for each player n, xn strictly dominates all its
pure strategies tn 6= sn; once the strategies tn 6= sn are eliminated, xn becomes strictly dominated by sn.
4The possibility of such a construction follows from a deep result in algebraic topology, the Hopf Extension
Theorem (Corollary 8.1.18, [20]).
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theory, that equilibria with index −1 are asymptotically unstable under any reasonable
learning or adjustment process—cf. McLennan [12].5 Even computational dynamics like
those generated by homotopy algorithms (Lemke-Howson, linear-tracing procedure, etc.)
converge to a +1 index equilibrium (Herings-Peeters [7]). While these results might be seen
as eliminating −1 equilibria, they do not conclusively come down in favor of +1 equilibria.
The main reason is that it is still an open question as to whether every regular game has
at least one equilibrium (necessarily of index +1) that is asymptotically stable with respect
to some natural dynamical system. Hofbauer observed that some +1 index equilibria are
indeed unstable for all natural dynamics, as the following potential game G1 shows.
6
G1 =
l m r
t (10, 10) (0, 0) (0, 0)
m (0, 0) (10, 10) (0, 0)
b (0, 0) (0, 0) (10, 10)
The profile where players mix uniformly is an isolated equilibrium with index +1 and
so it can be made unique in a larger game, for example by adding the three strategies x,
y, and z as in Gˆ1 below.
7 The fact is that all natural dynamics increase the potential of
G1; since the completely-mixed equilibrium minimizes that potential, it is unstable for all
natural dynamics—cf. Hofbauer [8] for more about his second conjecture, stating that any
regular game has at least one +1 index equilibrium which is asymptotically stable w.r.t.
some natural dynamics.8
Gˆ1 =
l m r x y z
t (10, 10) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 11) (10, 5) (0,−10)
m (0, 0) (10, 10) (0, 0) (0,−10) (0, 11) (10, 5)
b (0, 0) (0, 0) (10, 10) (10, 5) (0,−10) (0, 11)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the problem and states our
theorem. It also gives an informal summary of the theory of index of equilibria. Section 3
is devoted to proving the theorem. Section 4 provides a discussion of the role of regularity,
5In fact, this observation leads McLennan to articulate his index +1 principle, which selects +1 equilibria.
6Note however that in G1, the three pure equilibria are strict, have index +1 and can be shown to be
asymptotically stable for all natural dynamics.
7We refer the interested reader to von Schemde [23], p. 89-91, to understand how the strategies x, y and
z are geometrically constructed.
8It follows from Demichelis and Ritzberger [3] that Hofbauer’s second conjecture is false if we include all
games, because a necessary condition for a component of Nash equilibria to be asymptotically stable is that
its index agree with its Euler characteristic. Yet, there are examples (e.g. Ritzberger [18], p. 325) where all
components of equilibria are convex (and so have Euler characteristic +1), but no component has index +1.
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both in the definition and in the result. Finally, in the Appendix we review a construct from
the theory of triangulations that we need in the proof.
2. Definitions and statement of the theorem
A finite game in normal form is a triple (N , (Sn)n∈N , G) where: N = { 1, . . . , N } is the
set of players, with N > 2; for each n ∈ N , Sn is a finite set of pure strategies; and, letting
S ≡ ∏n∈N Sn be the set of pure strategy profiles, G : S → RN is the payoff function. By a
slight abuse of notation, we will refer to a game by its payoff function G.
Given a game G, for each n, let Σn be the set of n’s mixed strategies and let Σ ≡
∏
n∈N Σn.
Also, for each n, S−n ≡
∏
m 6=n Sn, and Σ−n ≡
∏
m6=n Σn. The payoff function G extends to
Σ in the usual way and we will denote this extension by G as well.
Define an equivalence relation on game-equilibrium pairs as follows. For i = 1, 2, let
((N i, (Sin)n∈N i , Gi), σi) be a game-equilibrium pair, i.e., σi is an equilibrium of Gi. Say that
(G1, σ1) ∼ (G2, σ2) if, up to a relabelling of players and strategies, the restriction of G1 to
the set of best replies to σ1 is the same game as the restriction of G2 to the set of best replies
to σ2, and the equilibria coincide under this identification.9 It is easily checked that ∼ is an
equivalence relation.
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium σ of a game G is sustainable if (G, σ) ∼ (G¯, σ¯) for a game
G¯ where σ¯ is the unique equilibrium.
Sustainability is a property of equivalence classes and we could say that the canonical
representation of a sustainable equilibrium is the game-equilibrium pair where there are no
inferior replies to the equilibrium.
2.1. Index and degree of equilibria. Both the index and the degree of equilibria are
measures of the robustness of equilibria to perturbations. They differ in the space of per-
turbations they consider (perturbations of fixed-point maps vs payoffs perturbations) but
ultimately agree with one another.10 We start with the degree of equilibria. For simplicity
we give a definition of degree only for regular equilibria. This approach allows to bypass
the use of algebraic topology, but more importantly it is germane to our problem, as we are
concerned only with regular equilibria in this paper. For the general definition, see for e.g.,
Govindan and Wilson [5].
9Note that this definition requires the number of players in an equivalence class to be the same.
10The reason we are defining and reviewing both concepts, when apparently one would do, is that they
are both useful in the exposition.
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Fix both the player set N and the strategy space S. The space of games with strat-
egy space S is then the Euclidean space Γ ≡ RN×S of all payoff functions G. Let E be
the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence over Γ, i.e., E = { (G, σ) ∈ Γ × Σ |
σ is a Nash equilibrium ofG }. Let proj : E → Γ be the natural projection: proj(G, σ) = G.
By the Kohlberg-Mertens Structure Theorem [9], there exists a homeomorphism h : E → Γ
such that h−1 is differentiable almost everywhere. Say that an equilibrium σ of a game G
is regular if proj ◦ h−1 is differentiable and has a nonsingular Jacobian at h(G, σ); and say
that a game is regular if each equilibrium σ of G is regular. If an equilibrium σ is regular,
then it is a quasi-strict equilibrium—that is, all unused strategies are inferior replies11—and
locally, the equilibrium is a smooth, even analytic, function of the game; moreover, it is also
a regular equilibrium in the space of games obtained by deleting the unused strategies or,
indeed, by adding strategies that are inferior replies to the equilibrium. The set of games
that are not regular is a closed subset of lower dimension—actually codimension one—in Γ
and thus regular games are generic.
If an equilibrium σ of a game G is regular, then we can assign a degree to it that is either
+1 or −1 depending on whether the Jacobian of proj ◦ h−1 at h(G, σ) has a positive or a
negative determinant. An inspection of the formula for the Jacobian shows that the degree of
a regular equilibrium σ is the same as its degree computed in the space of games obtained by
deleting the strategies that are inferior replies to σ. Therefore, if σ is a regular equilibrium
of G and if (G, σ) ∼ (G¯, σ¯) then σ¯ is a regular equilibrium of G¯ and it has the same degree
as σ, making degree an invariant for an equivalence class.
As the Kohlberg-Mertens homeomorphism extends to the one-point compactification of E
and Γ, and proj ◦ h−1 is homotopic to the identity on this extension, the sum of the degrees
of equilibria of a regular game is +1.12
In fixed-point theory, the index of fixed points contains information about their robustness
when the map is perturbed. (See McLennan [11] for an account of index theory written
primarily for economists.) Since Nash equilibria are obtainable as fixed points, index theory
applies directly to them. For simplicity, suppose f : U → Σ is a differentiable map defined
on a neighborhood U of Σ in RN |S| and such that the fixed points of f are the Nash equilibria
of a game G. Let d be the displacement of f , i.e., d(σ) = σ−f(σ). Then the Nash equilibria
of G are the zeros of d. Suppose now that the Jacobian of d at a Nash equilibrium σ of G
11See see Ritzberger [17] and van Damme [21].
12If G is nongeneric, we can define the degree of a component of equilbria as the sum of the degrees
of equilibria in a neighborhood of the component for a regular game that is in a neighborhood of G; this
computation is independent of the neighborhoods chosen, as long as they are sufficiently small. The sum of
the degrees of the components of equilibria of a game is +1.
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is nonsingular. Then we can define the index of σ under f as ±1 depending on whether the
determinant of the Jacobian of d is positive or negative.
One potential problem with the definition of index is the dependence of the computation
on the function f , as intuitively we would think of the index as depending only on the game
G. But, under some regularity assumptions of f , we can show that the index is independent
of f . Specifically, consider the class of continuous maps F : Γ×Σ→ Σ with the property that
the fixed points of the restriction of F to {G }×Σ are the Nash equilibria of G. Demichelis
and Germano [2] show that the index of equilibria is independent of the particular map in this
class that is used to compute it; Govindan and Wilson [4] show that the degree is equivalent
to the index computed using one of the maps in this class, the fixed-point map defined
by Gu¨l, Pearce and Stacchetti [6]. Thus, the index and degree of equilibria coincide—see
Demichelis and Germano [2] for an alternate, more direct, proof of this equivalence. Given
these results, for a regular equilibrium, we can talk unambiguously of its index and use the
term degree interchangeably with it.
2.2. Games in strategic form. It is convenient for us to work with a somewhat larger
class of games than normal-form games, called strategic-form games, and in this subsection
we will define these games—cf. Pahl [16] for an extensive treatment of these games.
A game in strategic form is a triple (N , (Pn)n∈N , V ) where: N is the player set; for each n,
Pn is a polytope
13 of strategies; V :
∏
n∈N Pn → RN is a multilinear payoff function. Clearly
any normal-form game is a strategic-form game. Going the other way, given a strategic-form
game (N , (Pn)n∈N , V ), we can define a normal-form game (N , (Sn)n∈N , G) where for each
n, Sn is the set of vertices of Pn and for each s ∈ S =
∏
n Sn, G(s) = V (s); the polytope Pn
can be viewed as the quotient space of Σn obtained by identifying all mixed strategies that
are duplicates of one another (i.e., induce the same payoffs for all players for any profile of
strategies of n’s opponents).
2.3. Statement of the theorem. The following theorem settles the Myerson-Hofbauer
conjecture in the affirmative.
Theorem 2.2. A regular equilibrium is sustainable iff its index is +1.
As the sum of the indices of the equilibria of a regular game is +1, there is at least one
with index +1. Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3. Every regular game has at least one sustainable equilibrium.
13A polytope is a convex hull of finitely many points.
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3. Proof of Theorem 2.2
We will present the proof in a sequence of steps, each of which will be carried out in a
separate subsection.
3.1. The index of a sustainable equilibrium. We begin with a proof of the necessity
of the condition. Let σ∗ be a regular equilibrium of a game G that is sustainable. Let
(G, σ∗) ∼ (G¯, σ¯), where σ¯ is the unique equilibrium of G¯. As we saw in the previous section,
the index is constant on an equivalence class. Since σ¯ is the unique equilibrium of G¯, its
index is +1, and the result follows.
3.2. Preliminaries. The rest of the section is devoted to proving the sufficiency of the
condition. In this subsection, we introduce some key ideas that we exploit in the proof.
First, we gather a list of notational conventions to be used. Throughout Section 3 (but not
in the Appendix) we use the `∞-norm on Euclidean spaces. For any subset A of a topological
space X, we let ∂XA be its topological boundary and intX(A) its interior. If C is a convex
set in a Euclidean space, then ∂C and int(C) refer to the boundary and the interior of C in
the affine space generated by C.
Definition 3.1. Given a payoff function G, and a vector h ∈ ∏n∈N RSn , let G ⊕ h be the
game where the payoff to player n from a profile s ∈ S is Gn(s) + hn,sn .
For a game G, recall that Nash [14] obtains its equilibria as fixed points of a map on the
strategy space. This function, which we denote by f , is defined as follows. For each n, sn
and σ, let φn,sn(σ) ≡ max { 0, Gn(sn, σ−n)−Gn(σ) } and φn ≡
∏
sn∈Sn φn,sn ; then
fn,sn(σ) ≡
σn,sn + φn,sn(σ)
1 +
∑
tn∈Sn φn,tn(σ)
.
For each n, fn(σ) = σn iff φn,sn = 0 for each sn ∈ Sn. If fn(σ) 6= σn for some n and σ, then
letting
rn(σ) =
(∑
tn∈Sn
φn,tn(σ)
)−1
φn(σ)
and
λn(σ) =
1
1 +
∑
tn∈Sn φn,tn(σ)
,
we have
fn(σ) = λn(σ)σn + (1− λn(σ))rn(σ).
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Thus fn(σ) is an average of σ and a mixed strategy rn(σ); rn(σ) has the following properties:
(1) it assigns a positive probability to a pure strategy iff it does strictly better than σ—in
particular, it assigns zero probability to some strategy in the support of σn, as fn(σ) 6= σn;
(2) it assigns the highest probabilities to the best replies to σ.
Definition 3.2. A game (N , S¯, G¯) embeds (N , S,G) if: (1) for each n: Sn ⊆ S¯n; and (2)
the restriction of G¯ to S equals G.
Again for notational convenience, we will talk of a game G¯ embedding G. When G¯ embeds
G, we view the set Σ of mixed strategies of G as a subset of the set Σ¯ of mixed strategies in
G¯. Obviously, if G¯ embeds G and σ is an equilibrium of G¯ where for each n, the strategies
that are not in Sn are inferior replies, then (G, σ) ∼ (G¯, σ). Our proof technique is to show
that for each regular +1 equilibrium σ∗ of G, we can embed G in a game G¯ where σ∗ is the
unique equilibrium and the newly added strategies are inferior replies to σ∗.
We say that a strategic-form game V¯ embeds G if the associated normal-form game G¯,
as defined in Subsection 2.2, embeds G, or equivalently for each n, each strategy in Sn is a
vertex of the polytope P¯n of n’s strategies in V¯ , and G(s) = V¯ (s) for all s ∈ S. In our proof
we construct embeddings of G in strategic-form games V¯ that have a simple structure: for
each n, the strategies in Sn span a face of P¯n.
3.3. A Simple consequence of regularity. From now on fix a game G and let σ∗ be a
regular equilibrium with index +1. For each n, let S∗n be the support of σ
∗
n. Our objective
in this subsection is to record the following simple, and yet consequential, property of σ∗.
There exists ε¯ > 0 such that: if σ 6= σ∗ is an equilibrium of G, then there exist two different
players n1, n2, such that for i = 1, 2, there exists sni ∈ S∗ni with σni,sni < σ∗ni,sni − ε¯. Indeed
if this property is not true, there exist a sequence k → ∞, a corresponding sequence σk of
equilibria converging to some σ, and a player n such that: (1) σk 6= σ∗ for all k; and (2)
for all m 6= n and sm ∈ S∗m, σkm,sm > σ∗m,sm − k−1. Therefore, σm = σ∗m for all m 6= n.
But σn 6= σ∗n as σ∗ is regular and, hence, isolated. This implies that λσ + (1 − λ)σ∗ is an
equilibrium for all λ ∈ [0, 1], again contradicting the fact that σ∗ is isolated. Thus, there
exists ε¯ with the stated property.14
For 0 < ε 6 ε¯, and each n, let Bεn be the set of σn ∈ Σn such that σn,sn > σ∗n,sn − ε for
all sn ∈ S∗n; and let Bε be the set of σ such that σn is not in Bεn for at most one n. (N.B.∏
n∈N B
ε
n ( Bε). Since Bε =
⋃
n(Σn ×
∏
m 6=nB
ε
m) is the union of finitely many closed sets,
it is closed.
14Note that this proof only uses the fact that σ∗ is isolated.
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3.4. Killing all fixed points of f other than σ∗. From the viewpoint of fixed-point
theory, our problem amounts to embedding Σ as a proper face of a polytope Σ¯, extending
f (the Nash map) to a function f¯ on it, and then modifying f¯ such that its only fixed point
is σ∗. From a game-theoretic viewpoint, there is an additional problem introduced by the
caveat that f¯ should, in a sense, be realizable as a fixed-point map of a game G¯ that embeds
G—i.e., a map whose fixed points are the equilibria of game G¯. In this subsection, we solve
the first problem partially, by constructing a map f 0 that coincides with f on Bε for some
0 < ε 6 ε¯ and that has no fixed points outside it. We will later use this map to construct
the embedding G¯.
If necessary by adding a strictly dominated strategy for each player, we can assume that σ∗n
belongs to ∂Σn for each n. (Recall that sustainability and index are properties of equivalence
classes of regular equilibria, so that the addition of such strategies is harmless.) Let V ≡ B ε¯;
X ≡ Σ \ intΣ(V ). The boundary of X is relative to the affine space generated by Σ, i.e.,
∂X ≡ (∂Σ\V )∪∂ΣV . We claim now that (X, ∂X) is homeomorphic to a ball with boundary.
Indeed, the desired homeomorphism can be constructed as follows. Pick a completely-mixed
strategy-profile σ0 such that σ0n,sn < σ
∗
n,sn − ε¯ for all n and sn ∈ S∗n. (Such a choice is
possible since σ∗n belongs to the boundary of Σn and if necessary, we can decrease the ε¯
defined above.) The set X is star-convex at σ0: for each σ ∈ X, λσ + (1 − λ)σ0 ∈ X for
all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, there is now a closed ball around σ0 in Σ \ ∂Σ that is contained in
X \ ∂X that is homeomorphic to X using radial projections from σ0.
Define f˜ : Σ → Σ as follows. First, using Urysohn’s lemma, construct a continuous
function α : Σ → [0, 1] that is zero on V and positive everywhere else. Then, letting τ 0n be
the barycenter of Σn for each n, define f˜(σ) = (1 − α(σ))f(σ) + α(σ)τ 0. The function f˜
equals f on V and therefore σ∗ is the unique fixed point of f˜ in V . The set Σ \V is mapped
by f˜ to Σ \ ∂Σ. Hence all the other fixed points of f˜ belong to X \ ∂X.
Let d˜ be the displacement of f˜ : d˜(σ) ≡ σ − f˜(σ). For each n, let An be the hyperplane
in RSn through the origin and with normal (1, . . . , 1), and let A =
∏
nAn. The map d˜ maps
Σ into A. As the index of σ∗ is +1, the sum of the indices of the other components of fixed
points of f˜ , which are contained in X \ ∂X, is zero. Therefore, d˜ : (X, ∂X) → (A,A − 0)
has degree zero. By the Hopf Extension Theorem (cf. Corollary 8.1.18, [20]) there exists a
map dˆ0 from X to A− 0 such that its restriction to ∂X coincides with d˜. Extend dˆ0 to the
whole of Σ by letting it be d˜ outside X, i.e., on V \ ∂ΣV .
For each σ ∈ Σ, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1] such that σ − λdˆ0(σ) ∈ Σ: indeed, this is obvious
for σ ∈ X \ ∂X, since σ belongs to the interior of Σ; for σ ∈ ∂X ∪ V , we can take λ = 1 as
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dˆ0 = d˜. Now for each σ, let λ(σ) be the largest λ ∈ [0, 1] such that σ− λ(σ)dˆ0(σ) ∈ Σ. Note
that the map σ 7→ λ(σ) is continuous. Define f 0 : Σ → Σ by: f 0(σ) = σ − λ(σ)dˆ0(σ). The
map f 0 is continuous, coincides with f on V , and has σ∗ as its unique fixed point.
3.5. Example. We now introduce a running example, where we can carry out our construc-
tion numerically, and which we hope will aid in the understanding of the proof. The example
differs from the text in one somewhat irrelevant respect: we focus on symmetric strategies,
as it reduces the dimension of the problem and allows us to perform a two-dimensional
graphical analysis as well.
The game we study is a two-player coordination game given below.
L R
L (1, 1) (0, 0)
R (0, 0) (1, 1)
Given our restriction to symmetric strategies, we will dispense with the subscript for
players in the notation (here and throughout the paper when we work with this example).
Thus, a symmetric mixed-strategy profile is represented by one number, x ∈ [0, 1], where x
is the probability of playing L. There are two pure strategy equilibria: x = 1 and x = 0,
both of which have index +1; and there is a mixed equilibrium, x = 1/2, which has index
−1. The restriction of the Nash map f to symmetric strategies allows us to represent it as
a function from [0, 1] to itself. By computation, we obtain:
f(x) ≡
{
x
1−2x2+x if x ∈ [0, 1/2]
x−2x2+3x−1
1−2x2+3x−1 if x ∈ (1/2, 1]
The graph of f , with its three fixed points corresponding to the three equilibria of the
game, is illustrated below in Figure 1. Let V ≡ [2/3, 1]. We can directly construct a map
f 0 as in the previous section, whose only fixed point is x = 1 (see the graph of f 0 in green
in Figure 1).15
f 0(x) ≡
{
7
8
if x ∈ [0, 2/3]
x−2x2+3x−1
1−2x2+3x−1 if x ∈ (2/3, 1]
15From Figure 1, one can observe that it is impossible to construct a map which coincides with f in the
neighbourhood of x = 1/2 (the equilibrium with index -1) and which has 1/2 as the unique fixed point.
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Figure 1. Graphs of f (black) and f 0 (green)
3.6. A parametrized family of perturbed games. Ideally, we would like a game G0 such
that f 0 is the Nash map of G0. This seems to be too strong a property to hold. However,
f 0 does contain enough information for us to construct a function g : Σ → ∏n∈N RSn such
that: (1) g(·) is zero on Bε for some sufficiently small ε; (2) σ is an equilibrium of G⊕ g(σ)
iff σ = σ∗.
Choose 0 < ε < ε¯ and let U ≡ Bε; note that U is a closed subset contained in the interior
of V . For each n, let Zn be (d
0
n)
−1
(0) ∩ (Σ \ intΣ(U)), where d0 is the displacement of f 0.
Let Z1n be the complement of Zn in Σ \ intΣ(U). Define r0n : Z1n → ∂Σn as follows. For each
σ ∈ Z1n, let r0n(σ) be the unique point in ∂Σn on the ray from σn through f 0n(σ), i.e., it is the
unique point of the form (1− α)σn + αf 0n(σ) for α > 1 that belongs to ∂Σn. If σ ∈ Z1n, then
there exists some tn that is in the support of σn but not of r
0
n(σ). For each n, sn, let Z
+
n,sn be
the closure of the set of σ ∈ Z1n for which r0n,sn(σ) > r0n,tn(σ) for all tn ∈ Sn. If f 0(σ) = f(σ)
(the Nash map) and σ ∈ Z1n, then r0n(σ) equals rn(σ) as defined in subsection 3.2; therefore,
σ ∈ Z+n,sn iff sn is a best reply to σ in G.
We are now ready to define the function g(σ). In doing so, we repeatedly invoke Urysohn’s
lemma to construct functions that are zero on a closed set and positive outside it. First,
let vn(σ) = maxsn Gn(sn, σ−n). Second, let β
1
n : Σ → [0, 1] be a continuous function that is
zero on Zn and positive everywhere else. Third, for each n, sn, let β
2
n,sn : Σ → [0, 1] be a
continuous function that is one on Z+n,sn and strictly smaller than one elsewhere. Finally, let
β3 : Σ → [0, 1] be a continuous function that is one on Σ \ intΣ(V ), zero on U and strictly
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positive everywhere else. For each n, sn and σ, define:
gn,sn(σ) = β
3(σ)β2n,sn(σ)[vn(σ)−Gn(sn, σ−n) + β1n(σ)].
If σ ∈ U , then g(σ) = 0 as β3(σ) = 0; and σ is an equilibrium of G⊕ g(σ) iff σ = σ∗.
Suppose σ /∈ U . Since σ∗ is the only fixed point of f 0, there exists some n such that
f 0n(σ) 6= σn. For this n, there exists sn such that: σ ∈ Z+n,sn (take sn s.t. r0n,sn(σ) > r0n,tn(σ)
for all tn ∈ Sn); and there is tn in the support of σn but not in the support of r0n(σ). This
implies β2n,sn(σ) = 1, while β
2
n,tn(σ) < 1.
If σ /∈ V , then β3(σ) = 1 and so,
Gn(sn, σ−n) + gn,sn(σ) = vn(σ) + β
1
n(σ) > vn(σ) + β
2
n,tnβ
1
n(σ) > Gn(tn, σ−n) + gn,tn(σ),
showing that σ is not an equilibrium of G⊕ g(σ).
If σ ∈ V \U , then as f 0 coincides with f , sn is a best reply against σ while tn is not. Thus
Gn(sn, σ−n) = vn(σ) and Gn(tn, σ−n) < vn(σ). Since β3(σ) > 0, we obtain that
Gn(sn, σ−n)+gn,sn(σ) = vn(σ)+β
3(σ)β1n(σ) > vn(σ)+β
3(σ)β2n,tn(σ)β
1
n(σ) > G(tn, σ−n)+gn,tn(σ),
and again σ is not an equilibrium of G⊕g(σ). Thus the function g has the desired properties.
3.7. Example. We continue with the example of subsection 3.5. We will construct the
function g of the previous section. (Recall our convention of dropping the player subscript
for terms like Zn, Z
1
n.) What we are after is a function g : [0, 1] → R{L,R} such that x = 1
is the only (symmetric) equilibrium of the game G ⊕ g(x). Let U ≡ [3/4, 1]. First recall
that f 0 has no fixed point outside U , so Z is empty and Z1 = [0, 3/4]. For each x ∈ [0, 3/4],
f 0(x) > x, which implies that r0n(x) = 1 so that Z
+
L = [0, 3/4]. Now, by computation one
gets,
vn(x) ≡
{
1− x if x ∈ [0, 1/2]
x if x ∈ (1/2, 1].
Because Z is empty, we can set β1(·) to be a constant function equal to δ > 0. The map
β3(·) will be defined as follows:
β3(x) ≡

1 if x ∈ [0, 2/3]
−12x+ 9 if x ∈ (2/3, 3/4)
0 if x ∈ (3/4, 1].
There is no need to introduce the function β2(·) in this example. Putting these ingredients
together, we can define g as follows: gL(x) = β
3(x)[v1(x) − x + δ] and gR ≡ 0. We show
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that if the payoffs are now perturbed according to the bonus function g for each player, the
only remaining equilibrium is x = 1. Let x be an equilibrium of the perturbed game. If
x ∈ [0, 2/3], β3(x) = 1, so if player 1 plays x, player 2 gets δ more than the best payoff v(x)
in the unperturbed game from playing L whereas by playing R he will not get more than
v2(x). Therefore, x = 1, which is a contradiction. On the other hand, if x ∈ [2/3, 1], then L
is already the strict best-reply in the original game and since the g is nonnegative, it follows
that x = 1 is the unique equilibrium of the perturbed game.
3.8. Isolating σ∗. Before we can use the perturbation g, we need to first embed G in a
game G˜ where σ∗ is the only equilibrium in the face Σ of G˜ and in fact the only equilibrium
in which the strategy of even one of the players is in Σn. (The perturbation g is then used
on the face opposite to Σ.) Hence, the embedding G˜ will be such that if σ˜ is an equilibrium
of G˜ and the support of σ˜n is in Sn, then σ˜ = σ
∗. The game G˜ that embeds G will be
represented in strategic form.
Choose 0 < ε∗ < ε such that σ∗n,sn > ε
∗ for each n and sn ∈ S∗n. Let U∗ ≡ Bε∗ and
U∗n ≡ Bε∗n , for each n ∈ N ; the set U∗ is a proper subset of U (and is a closed subset
contained in the interior of V ). For each n, choose an arbitrary object 0∗n (not in S
∗
n). Let
Θn be the set of distributions over
∏
m6=n(S
∗
m ∪ { 0∗m }). For each player n, his strategy set
Σ˜n in G˜ is Σn ×Θn. A typical element σ˜n ∈ Σ˜n has coordinates (σn, θn).
We will now describe the payoff functions. For each θn ∈ Θn and m 6= n, we let θn,m be
the marginal distribution of θn over S
∗
m ∪ { 0∗m } and let Θn,m be the set of all probability
distributions over S∗m ∪ { 0∗m }. For each m 6= n, let γn,m : Θn,m × Σm → R be a bilinear
function defined as follows. For all σm, γn,m(0
∗
m, σm) = 0, while for sm ∈ S∗m, γn,m(sm, σm) =
1− (σ∗m,sm − ε∗)−1σm,sm . For each σ˜, player n’s payoff in G˜ is:16
G˜n(σ˜) = Gn(σ) + γn(θn, σ−n),
where
γn(θn, σ−n) ≡
∑
m 6=n
γn,m(θn,m, σm).
Notice that the payoff function of each player n is affine over each strategy set Σ˜m, m =
1, ..., N , so G˜ is indeed a well-defined game in strategic form. For each n, let θ0n = (0
∗
m)m6=n.
Then G is embeddable in G˜ as the face Σn × { θ0n } is a copy of the original face Σn, for
n = 1, ..., N .
16Technically, Θn,m and γn,m do not depend on n.
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Suppose σ˜ is an equilibrium of G˜, then σ is an equilibrium of G, as the functions γn of
each player n do not depend on σn. If σ = σ
∗, then the unique θn,m that is optimal for each
n 6= m is 0∗m and thus the equilibrium uses θ0n for each n. On the other hand if σ 6= σ∗, by the
property of subsection 3.3, there are at least two players m for whom σm /∈ U∗m. Therefore,
for each n, there is at least one m 6= n such that 0∗n,m is not optimal. Thus for each n, the
support of θn does not include θ
0
n.
To conclude, if σ˜ = (σn, θn)n∈N is an equilibrium of G˜, then σ is an equilibrium of G and
either: (1) σ = σ∗ and θn = θ0n, for each n ∈ N ; or (2) σ 6= σ∗ and the support of θn does
not contain θ0n for any n ∈ N .
3.9. Example. In the context of the example of subsection 3.5: Θ = ∆({0∗} ∪ {L}). We
identify Θ with [0, 1] and an element θ1 ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of L. We define the
function γ: let γ(0∗, x) = 0 and γ(L, x) = 1 − 8x
7
. Then define γ(θ, x) = θ1γ(L, x) + (1 −
θ1)γ1(0
∗, x). The graph of γ(L, x) is depicted below in red in Figure 2. Define ε∗ = 1/8.
Figure 2. Graph of γ(L, ·) (red)
The strategic-form game is now defined by letting each player’s strategy set be the square
[0, 1]× [0, 1]. The payoff function (which has to be defined for all profiles) is as follows. For
player 1, G˜1(x, θ1, y, θ2) = G1(x, y) + γ(θ1, y); the payoffs for player 2 are defined symmetri-
cally. If player 2 plays y < 7/8, it follows that the (strict) best-reply of player 1 is to play
θ1 = 1, in order to capture the positive bonus coming from γ(L, x); if y > 7/8, then the
bonus γ(L, y) is nonpositive, and θ1 = 0 is a best-reply, which makes the payoffs of the per-
turbed game equal to the original payoffs. This game has a copy of the original equilibrium
x = 1: both players choose θ = 0 and x = 1. Any other equilibrium is such that θ = 1.
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3.10. The embedding G¯δ. The embedding that allows us to obtain σ∗ as the unique equi-
librium (and regular as well) will be built from G˜ by adding a finite number of mixed
strategies as pure strategies and by defining their payoffs to eliminate all other equilibria.17
The set Σ\intΣ(U∗) is compact, g(·) is continuous, and no σ ∈ Σ\intΣ(U∗) is an equilibrium
ofG⊕g(σ), as shown in subsection 3.6. Hence, there exists η > 0 such that no σ ∈ Σ\intΣ(U∗)
is an equilibrium of G⊕g for any g with ‖g−g(σ)‖ 6 η. Also, since g is uniformly continuous,
there exists 0 < ζ < 1/3 such that ‖g(σ)− g(σ′)‖ 6 η, if ‖σ − σ′‖ 6 ζ. Reduce ζ to ensure
that it is also smaller than the distance between U∗n and ∂ΣnUn for each n.
For each n, take a triangulation Tn of Σn × Θn with the following properties. (See the
Appendix for the details.) (1) The only vertices in Σn × { θ0n } of Tn are pure strategies
(sn, θ
0
n), sn ∈ Sn; (2) letting Θ1n be the face of Θn where θ0n has zero probability, if Tn ∈ Tn
is a simplex either with a face in Σn × Θ1n, or shares a face with such a simplex, then the
diameter of Tn is less than ζ; (3) there exists a convex function %n : Σn × Θn → R+ such
that: (a) %n(λx + (1 − λ)y) = λ%n(x) + (1 − λ)%n(y) iff x and y belong to a simplex Tn of
Tn; (b) %−1n (0) = Σn × { θ0n }.
Let S¯0n be the set of vertices of the triangulation Tn. Let S¯1n ≡ S¯0n+1 modulo N . A typical
element of S¯0n is a pair (σn, θn) in Σn × Θn that is a vertex of Tn. We fix a pure strategy
s0n ∈ Sn for each n. These pure strategies will be used below to define the perturbation of
payoffs pin for each player n. We denote a typical element of S¯
1
n by (σn,n+1, θn,n+1), which is
a vertex in Tn+1. For i = 0, 1, let Σ¯in be the set of mixtures over S¯in. The pure strategy set
of player n in the game G¯δ in normal form is S¯n ≡ S¯0n × S¯1n. The set of mixed strategies is
denoted Σ¯n. For each mixed strategy σ¯n, and i = 0, 1, we let σ¯
i
n be the marginals over S¯
i
n.
Define S¯ ≡∏n S¯n and Σ¯ ≡∏n Σ¯n. Also, let S¯i ≡∏n S¯in and Σ¯i ≡∏n Σ¯in for i = 0, 1.
Fix δ > 0. We will now define the payoff function G¯δ. For each n, let T 1n be the collection
of simplices of Tn that have nonempty intersection with Σn × Θ1n. Given a pure strategy
profile s¯ ∈ S¯ with s¯n = (σn, θn, σn,n+1, θn,n+1) for each n, the payoff G¯δn(s¯) has five distinct
components:
G¯δn(s¯) = Gn(σ) +
∑
sn∈Sn
g1n,sn(s¯−n)σn,sn + γn(θn, σ−n) + pin(s¯
1
n, s¯
0
n+1)− δ%n(s¯0n).
17von Schemde and von Stengel have an explicit bound on the number of strategies they add, which is
three times the number of pure strategies in G. In our construction, we have no way of obtaining such a
bound: the construction depends on the fixed-point map f0 obtained in subsection 3.4, which in turn relies
on an existence result, the Hopf Extension Theorem (cf. Corollary 8.1.18, [20]).
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The first and the third terms have been defined before. The function %n in the last term is
the convex function defined above. We will specify the other two terms.
g1n,sn(s¯−n) = ξn(s¯
0
−n)gn,sn(σ1, . . . , σn−1, σn−1,n, σn+1, . . . , σN),
where ξn(s¯
0
−n) is one if for each m 6= n, s¯0m is a vertex of some simplex in T 1m; otherwise
it is zero. The function pin is 0 if either: (1) s¯
0
n+1 is a vertex of some simplex in T 1n+1 and
s¯1n = s¯
0
n+1; or (2) s¯
0
n+1 is not a vertex of such a simplex, but s¯
1
n = (s
0
n+1, θ
0
n+1) (s
0
n+1 is a
fixed pure strategy chosen above, while θ0n+1 is the collection (0
∗
n,m)); elsewhere it is −1. The
definition of G¯δ clearly implies that it embeds G.
We want to make a couple of remarks about the payoffs. First, the function pin incentivizes
player n to mimic player n+1 whenever the latter is choosing a strategy close to Σn+1×Θ1n+1:
if n + 1 randomizes over the vertices of a simplex Tn+1 ∈ T 1n+1, then player n’s best replies
must be among the vertices of the simplex. This will be a crucial property, since the choices
in Σn−1,n play a role in the evaluation of the bonus function g1n. The idea is that whenever
the bonus function g1n is active, meaning that all players m 6= n randomize over the vertices
of a simplex Tm in T 1m, then each pure best-reply for player n must choose a vertex of Tn+1.
On the other hand, if player n+1 is randomizing over Sn+1×{ θ0n+1 } then it follows that the
unique best-reply for player n is to choose the previously fixed strategies s¯1n = (s
0
n+1, θ
0
n+1).
Our second remark concerns the nature of the payoffs for mixed strategies. For n and
each i = 0, 1, there is a linear map pin : Σ¯n :→ Σn+i × Θn+i that sends each pure s¯n to the
corresponding mixed strategy in Σn+i × Θn+i. For each n, the first and the third terms of
the payoffs depend on σ¯ only through their images under p0 =
∏
n∈N p
0
n; the fourth term
depends on all the information in σ¯1n and σ¯
0
n+1. The second term depends on σ¯n only through
p0n, but requires the entire information in σ¯−n, while the last term requires the information
in σ¯0n.
3.11. Wrapping up the proof. Let σ¯∗ be the profile where for each player n, the marginal
on Σ¯0n is (σ
∗, θ0n) and the marginal on Σ¯
1
n is (s
0
n+1, θ
0
n+1). For δ > 0, σ¯∗ is an equilibrium of
G¯δ, and (G, σ∗) ∼ (G¯δ, σ¯∗). We will now show that for δ sufficiently small, this is the only
equilibrium of G¯δ, which completes the proof.
Say that a strategy σ¯n is admissible for player n if the support of its marginal σ¯
0
n ∈ Σ¯0n
is the set of vertices of a simplex Tn in Tn. Observe that for any δ > 0, every best reply
for player n is admissible. Indeed, the first three components of n’s payoff function depend
on n’s strategy only through its projection to Σn × Θn and the fourth is independent of
these choices. Therefore, any two strategies for n that project under p0n to the same point
in Σn×Θn yield the same payoffs for these four terms, leaving the fifth to decide which one
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is better. But the map %n is convex, and it is linear precisely on the simplices of Tn, which
then forces each best reply to be a mixture over the vertices of a simplex of Tn.
We claim that if δ = 0 and the only admissible equilibrium of G¯δ is σ¯∗, then for sufficiently
small δ > 0, σ¯∗ is the only equilibrium of G¯δ. To prove this claim, suppose that we have
a sequence σ¯δ of equilibria of G¯δ converging to some equilibrium σ¯0 of G¯0, then as we saw
above σ¯δ must be admissible, and hence also its limit σ¯0. As we have assumed that σ¯∗ is the
unique admissible equilibrium of G¯0, σ¯0 = σ¯∗. Observe now that for each n, every pure best
reply in G¯0 to σ¯∗ is of the form (sn, θ0n, s
0
n+1, θ
0
n+1) where sn ∈ Sn is a best reply to σ∗; and
this property holds for best replies to σ¯δ, for small δ. Thus for each such δ, and for each n,
σ¯δn is of the form (σ
δ
n, θ
0
n, s
0
n+1, θ
0
n+1), where σ
δ
n is a best reply to σ
∗ in G. In other words,
σδ is an equilibrium of G. As σδ converges to σ∗ and as σ∗ is an isolated equilibrium of G,
σδ = σ∗ for all small δ. Thus the claim follows and it is sufficient to show that σ¯∗ is the only
admissible equilibrium for δ = 0.
To prove this last point, fix now an admissible equilibrium σ¯ with marginals (σ¯0, σ¯1) ∈
Σ¯0× Σ¯1 of the game G¯0. For each n, let (σn, θn) and (σn,n+1, θn,n+1) be the image of σ¯n under
p0n and p
1
n, resp. Also, let Tn be the simplex of Tn generated by the support of σ¯0n for each n.
Suppose first for each n, Tn belongs to T 1n . For each n, θn assigns probability less than ζ,
which is smaller than one, to θ0n. Also, for at least two n, σn /∈ intΣn(U∗n): indeed, otherwise
there is one player n all of whose opponents m are choosing in intΣn(U
∗
m), making θ
0
n the
unique optimal choice, which is impossible. Thus, σn /∈ intΣn(U∗n) for at least two n, i.e.,
σ /∈ intΣ(U∗) and, hence, σ is not an equilibrium of G ⊕ g(σ). For each n, and each s¯−n in
the support of σ¯−n, ξn(s¯0−n) = 1 as s¯
0
m is a vertex of the simplex Tm, which is in T 1m, for each
m; because of the function pin, the optimality of σ¯
1
n−1 implies that each s¯
1
n−1 in the support
of σ¯1n−1 is a vertex of Tn. Therefore, for each s¯−n in the support of σ¯−n, ‖g1(s¯−n)−g(σ)‖ 6 η
and then ‖g1(σ¯−n)− g(σ)‖ 6 η. As σ is not an equilibrium of G⊕ g(σ), by the choice of η
in subsection 3.10, it is not an equilibrium of G⊕ g1(σ¯), which contradicts the fact that σ¯ is
an equilibrium of G¯0.
Now suppose that for exactly one n, say n = 1, Tn does not belong to T 1n . Then, θ01
has positive probability under θ1. Therefore, because of the definition of γn, σn ∈ U∗n for
n > 1, i.e., σ ∈ U∗. For n > 1, the fact that σn ∈ U∗n and Tn belongs to T 1n imply that
for each s¯0n = (σn, θn) in the support of σ¯
0
n, σn belongs to Un (as the diameter of Tn is less
than ζ, which is smaller than the distance between U∗ and ∂ΣU). Thus, g11(σ) = 0. We will
now show that g1n(σ) = 0 for n > 1. The payoff function pin for each n 6= N forces each
strategy s¯1n = (σn,n+1, θn,n+1) in the support of σ¯
1
n to be a vertex of Tn+1 and hence σn,n+1
is in Un+1. Therefore, for n > 1, σn−1,n ∈ Un. Recall that gn(·) was constructed to be 0
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on U . Consequently, for each n > 1, g1n(s¯−n) = 0 for each s¯−n in the support of σ¯−n, i.e.,
g1n(σ¯−n) = 0.
The fact that g1(σ) = 0, implies that σ = σ∗. Optimality of θn for n > 1 now requires
that it assign probability one to θ0n. This is a contradiction: since Tn ∈ T 1n , its diameter is
smaller than ζ (and hence one), putting it at positive distance from Σn × { θ0n }.
Finally, suppose that for at least two players n, Tn does not belong to T 1n . Then, again
because of γn, for each n, σn ∈ U∗n. We claim that for each n, g1n(s¯−n) = 0 for each s¯−n in the
support of σ¯−n. Indeed, if for some m 6= n, Tm has no vertex that belongs to a simplex in
T 1m, then ξn is zero by construction at each s¯−n in the support and we are done. Otherwise,
if for each m 6= n, Tm has a vertex in T 1m then, letting s¯0m = (σm, θm) be an arbitrary vertex
of Tm, it follows from the fact that the diameter of each Tm is less than ζ that σm ∈ Um,
which implies σ ∈ U . Therefore, g1n(·) is again zero on the support of σ¯−n.
It follows from the previous paragraph that σ is an equilibrium of G, i.e., σ = σ∗, making
θn = θ
0
n. Finally, optimality of σ¯
1
n implies that it is (s
0
n,n+1, θ
0
n,n+1), as it yields zero with
others yielding −1. Thus, σ¯ = σ¯∗, which concludes the proof.
3.12. Example. We can triangulate the strategy set Σ×Θ ≡ [0, 1]× [0, 1] of each player as
in Figure 3. The horizontal axis represents Θ = [0, 1] and the vertical axis Σ = [0, 1].
Figure 3. Triangulation of [0, 1]2
Payoffs are defined in the exact same way as in subsection 3.10 with the following mod-
ifications: the function pi ≡ 0, since there is no need to duplicate the strategy set of each
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player (by our construction, gn depends only on σ−n); the function ξ is equal to 1 at all
vertices of the triangulation that lie on the face θ = 1.
Paralleling the proof of subsection 3.10, we show that the only admissible equilibrium of
the perturbed game G¯δ with δ = 0 is the (symmetric) equilibrium (θ, x), where x = 1 and
θ = 0. To see this, let (x, θ) be an equilibrium. Suppose first x < 7/8. Then θ = 1 is a strict
best-reply. The support of the equilibrium (θ, x) is then a subset of one of the 1-dimensional
simplices that subdivide {1}× [0, 1]. By our construction of g and the fact that it is linear in
each of these simplices, it follows that x = 1, which is a contradiction. Therefore, x > 7/8.
Recall that in the original game L is a strict best-reply if x > 7/8. Since γ(L, x) 6 0 and
gL > 0 (whereas gR ≡ 0), it follows that L is a strict-best reply in G¯δ and thus x = 1.
Finally, given x = 1, θ = 0 is the optimal choice in Θ.
4. Discussion
There are two aspects of genericity—one concerning the definition of sustainability and
the other the statement of the theorem—that we would like to highlight. First, in the
definition of equivalence between game-equilibrium pairs, we require that the games obtained
by restricting the strategies to the best replies to the equilibria, rather than to the support
of the equilibria, be the same. Of course, if both games are regular, then we could have
used either requirement.18 Also, if we are dealing with two-player games, then, too, we
could use just the support due to the fact that a unique equilibrium of a bimatrix game is
quasi-strict (Norde [15]). However, in N -person games, uniqueness does not guarantee quasi-
strictness (Brandt and Fischer [1]). We now construct an example that exploits this feature
of N -person games to show that our theorem would fail if we merely restrict strategies to
the support of equilibria. Consider the following three-player game G, where player 3 is a
dummy player, whose unique action is W .
l r
t (6, 6, 1) (0, 0, 1)
b (0, 0, 1) (6, 6, 1)
This game has three equilibria: two strict equilibria, (t, l) and (b, r), which have index +1,
and a mixed equilibrium σ∗ where players 1 and 2 mix uniformly, which has index −1.
Define now a game G¯ where each player has three choices. Player 1’s strategy set is
{ (T, t), (T, b), B }; 2’s strategy set is { (L, l), (L, r), R }; 3’s strategy set is {W,Ew, Eε }.
The payoffs are:
18Hofbauer states his definition in the body of his paper using the supports, but he adds a footnote that
we need to include best replies if the game is not regular.
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W :
L R
T
l r
t (6, 6, 1) (0, 0, 1)
b (0, 0, 1) (6, 6, 1)
(3, 3, 0)
B (3, 0, 1) (0, 3, 1)
Ew :
L R
T
l r
t (−3, 0, 4) (1, 4, 0)
b (1, 4, 0) (1, 4, 0)
(1, 0, 1)
B (3, 0, 0) (0, 3, 0)
Ee :
L R
T
l r
t (1, 4, 0) (1, 4, 0)
b (1, 4, 0) (−3, 0, 4)
(3, 0, 1)
B (3, 0, 0) (0, 3, 0)
If we delete B, R, Ew, Ee, we get the game G and so G¯ embeds G. The unique equilibrium
of this game is the mixed equilibrium σ∗ of G. The pair (G¯, σ∗) is not equivalent to (G, σ∗)
under the definition of this paper since, for instance strategy B is a best reply to σ∗ but it
is not a strategy in G. However, if we merely ask for equivalence using supports, then the
two pairs are equivalent and we would make a regular −1 equilibrium sustainable.19
The second point about genericity is that we focus on regular equilibria in our theorem in
order to align our paper with the Hofbauer-Myerson conjecture. But what really matters, as
a careful reading of the proof shows, is one particular implication of regularity, namely that
regular equilibria are isolated. Thus, we could obtain a slightly stronger result: an isolated
equilibrium is sustainable iff its index is +1.
When the game is not regular, in particular if it has nontrivial components of equilibria,
then there is an obvious extension of the definition of sustainability to components, which
replaces equilibria with components. However, such a refinement may fail to exist: for
example, we could have two components of equilibria in a game20, one with index +2 and
the other with index −1; it is impossible to obtain either as the unique solution of a larger
game.
Even when a given game has a unique component of equilibria, which has index +1,
indeterminacy of equilibria may persist in any equivalent game with an expanded set of
strategies, as we will now show. Consider the following game G:
L R
T (1, 1) (0, 1)
19This example shows that in a three-player game G, a regular equilibrium σ with index −1 can be made
unique in a larger game G¯, but then it is not quasi-strict in G¯ and thus (G, σ) and (G¯, σ) are not equivalent.
This cannot happen in two-player games because if an equilibrium σ of G can be made unique in G¯, it must
be quasi-strict in G¯ from Norde [15] and so (G, σ) and (G¯, σ) must be equivalent.
20Ritzberger [18], p. 325.
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This game has a unique component of equilibria {(T, yL + (1− y)R), y ∈ [0, 1]} and two
pure equilibria (T, L) and (T,R). We claim that no equilibrium of G can be made unique by
adding strategies. To see this, let Ĝ be obtained from G by adding rows r ∈ R and columns
l ∈ L with associated payoffs g(r, l) and suppose that an equilibrium σ of G can be made
unique in Ĝ. Observe that σ cannot be pure because otherwise it will be non quasi-strict
in G, and so non-quasi strict in Ĝ, a contradiction with Norde’s result. Suppose now that
σ = (T, yL+(1−y)R), y ∈]0, 1[. Let τ = (T, L) be a pure equilibrium. Then τ is the unique
equilibrium of the following perturbation Gε.
L R
T (1, 1 + ε) (0, 1)
Now, we add to Gε the extension of G which are the rows r ∈ R and the columns l ∈ L
with associated payoffs g(r, l). This defines a perturbed game Ĝε of Ĝ. Since Ĝ has a
unique equilibrium σ, by upper-hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence, Ĝε has
an equilibrium σε that converges to σ as ε goes to zero. Because τ is the unique equilibrium
of Gε, necessarily there is r ∈ R (or l ∈ L) in the support of σε (otherwise, σε would
be an equilibrium of Gε and so σε = τ , a contradiction). By continuity, r (or l) is still
a best response to σ, showing that σ is not a quasi-strict equilibrium in Ĝ, establishing a
contradiction (again with Norde’s result).
It is noteworthy that, if we can add also players then any equilibrium of the last game
can be made unique.21 For example, the pure and non quasi-strict equilibrium (T, L) of the
game above is the projection of the unique equilibrium (T, L,W ) of the following 3-player
game.22
W :
L R
T (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 0)
B (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1)
E :
L R
T (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1)
B (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
The above considerations suggest that an extension of the definition of sustainability
to nongeneric games—and index-theoretic characterizations of it—is a nontrivial question,
which we hope future research will address.
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Appendix
Construction of the triangulation. Here we construct a triangulation Tn of Σn×Θn for
each n with the properties stated in subsection 3.10. We start with some definitions.
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A simplex T in Rd is the convex hull of affinely independent points x0, x1, . . . , xk (k 6 d);
a face of T is the convex hull of a subset of the points xi. A triangulation T of a polytope
C ⊂ Rd is a finite collection of simplices T in Rd such that: (1) if T ∈ T , so is every face
of T ; (2) the intersection of two simplices in T is a face of both (possibly empty); (3) the
union of the simplices in T equals C.
Throughout this Appendix, we use the `2 norm, unless we specify differently. Given a
finite collection {x0, x1, . . . , xk } of points, (where k is now an arbitrary positive integer) let
C be its convex hull. Suppose that the xi’s are in general position for spheres in Rd—i.e.,
no d + 2 points lie in any (d − 1)-sphere (centered at any point and of any radius) in Rd.
We can construct a triangulation of the convex hull C, called the Delaunay triangulation,
as follows (cf. Loera et al [10] for details). Let D be the convex hull of the set of points
(xi, ‖xi‖2) ∈ Rd+1, i = 0, 1, . . . k. Let D0 be the lower envelope of D. The natural projection
(x, y) 7→ x from D0 to Rd is C and D0 is the graph of a piece-wise linear and convex function
% : C → R with the property that the subsets on which % is linear are simplices, whose
projections then yield the simplices of a triangulation of C.
There is a dual representation of the Delaunay triangulation, known as the Voronoi Di-
agram, which works as follows. For each i = 0, 1, . . . k, let Pi be the polyhedron in Rd
consisting of points y in Rd such that ‖y − xi‖ 6 ‖y − xj‖ for all j 6= i. We then have
a polyhedral complex (which is like a simplicial complex but with polyhedra rather than
simplices) where the maximal polyhedra are the Pi. There is an edge between two vertices
xi and xj in the Delaunay triangulation iff the polyhedra Pi and Pj have a nonempty inter-
section. Also, the intersection of d + 1 of these polyhedra when nonempty is a single point
(because of genericity), that is then the center p of a ball that contains d + 1 points of the
collection on its boundary and no other point in the ball itself—these d + 1 points span a
d-dimensional simplex in the Delaunay triangulation.
For our purposes, we need a triangulation with the diameter of certain simplices to be
smaller than ζ, as specified in Subsection 3.10. To obtain that, we begin with an auxiliary
construction. Let C be a full-dimensional polytope in Rd whose set of vertices, X, are in
general position for spheres. Let B0 be a proper face of C with X0 the set of vertices of B0
and X1 = X \X0. Let H be a hyperplane that strictly separates B0 from the vertices of C
that are not in B0. Let B be the intersection of C with the halfspace generated by H that
contains B0 in its interior, i.e., B is of the form C ∩H− where H− = {x ∈ Rd|a · x 6 b} and
a · x < b for all x ∈ B0. Let Y be the set of vertices of B that are not in X0.
We claim now that if the normal a and constant b of the hyperplane H are in general
position, then C admits a Delaunay triangulation with the vertex set X ∪ Y . To see this
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claim, let E be the set of edges e of C that have a vertex x0(e) in X0 and one x1(e) in X1.
Each vertex y ∈ Y is of the form α(e)x0(e) + (1−α(e))x1(e) for some e ∈ E. The genericity
of H is equivalent to making a generic choice of α(e) for d of these edges e. Take now a set
V of d + 2 of the vertices in X ∪ Y . If all of the vertices are in X then the intersection of
their Voronoi polyhedra is empty, as the vertices of C are in general position for spheres.
If now a subset y1, . . . , yl of l of these vertices lie on edges, then for each yi, at most one
of the two endpoints of the edge can belong to the collection V if their Voronoi polyhedra
are to intersect. For each of the yi’s there is a choice of α (which is one or zero) for which
the Voronoi polyhedra do not intersect; therefore, for generic α’s the intersection is empty.
Thus, if H is in generic position, then the vertices of X and Y can be used to carry out a
Delaunay triangulation of C.
Fix now C and B as above. Let δ > 0 be such that ‖x− y‖ > δ/2, for all x ∈ B and
vertices y ∈ C \ B. Let Xδ be a finite collection of points in C such that: (1) Xδ contains
the vertices of C but no other point in C \ B; (2) for x ∈ B, there is a point xδ ∈ B ∩Xδ
such that ‖x− xδ‖ < δ/2 and xδ belongs to the face of B that contains x in its interior; (3)
every point in intC(B) ∩ Xδ is at least δ/2 from ∂CB; (4) the points in Xδ are in general
position for spheres, call Tδ the associated Delaunay triangulation of C. (The argument that
generically there exists a Delaunay triangulation as required in (4) is similar to the argument
in the previous paragraph.)
The triangulation Tδ above achieves two properties: (i) every simplex with vertices in B
has diameter at most δ; (ii) every simplex of Tδ that has a vertex outside B does not intersect
intC(B). To prove these properties, define r : Rd → B by letting r(x) be the point in B that
is closest to x. If r(x) 6= x, r(x) belongs to a proper face of B, and then we can write r(x)
as x− p where p is a normal for a supporting hyperplane at r(x) with p · r(x) > p · y for all
y ∈ B. If in addition r(x) ∈ intC(B), then r(x) is at the boundary of C and so p ·r(x) > p ·y
for all y ∈ C as well. Suppose r(x) 6= x and let r(x) = x − p. Let y be a point such that
p · y 6 p · r(x). Let z be the nearest-point projection of y onto the line from x through r(x).
Then
‖x− y‖2 = (‖x− r(x)‖+ ‖r(x)− z‖)2 + ‖z − y‖2 > ‖r(x)− x‖2 + ‖r(x)− y‖2,
with the inequality being an equality iff z = r(x), i.e., p · y = p · r(x).
We are now ready to prove that Tδ has the requisite properties. Let xδ be a point in Xδ∩B
and let x be a point in Rd that belongs to the Voronoi polyhedron P (xδ) of xδ. We claim
that ‖r(x)− xδ‖ < δ/2. If r(x) = x, this follows directly from Property (2) of Xδ. Suppose
that r(x) 6= x. Then r(x) belongs to the interior of a proper face B′ of B and as we saw in
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the last paragraph, r(x) can be written as x− p. By definition of r(x), p · xδ 6 p · r(x) and
thus: ‖x− xδ‖2 > ‖r(x)− x‖2 + ‖r(x)− xδ‖2. By Property (2), there exists yδ in B′ ∩ Xδ
such that ‖r(x) − yδ‖ < δ/2. Obviously p · yδ = p · r(x) and since x ∈ P (xδ), it follows
that ‖x− xδ‖2 6 ‖x− yδ‖2 < ‖r(x)− x‖2 + δ2/4; therefore, ‖r(x)− xδ‖ < δ/2, as claimed.
Observe that we proved that ‖x− xδ‖2 < ‖r(x)− x‖2 + δ2/4, a fact we will use below.
From the above paragraph, for each xδ ∈ Xδ∩B and each x ∈ P (xδ), the distance between
r(x) and xδ is less than δ/2; We claim finally that the diameter of each simplex with vertices
in B is less than δ. Indeed, letting xδ and yδ be two vertices of a simplex in B, then their
Voronoi cells intersect, so we can take x in the intersection. Since r(x) is of distance δ/2
from xδ and δ/2 from yδ, xδ and yδ are distant less than δ. This concludes the proof that Tδ
satisfies (i).
We now prove that Tδ satisfies (ii): for this, it is sufficient to show that the intersection of
P (xδ) and P (yδ) is empty for all xδ ∈ intC(B)∩Xδ and yδ in Xδ \B. Take such a pair xδ, yδ.
Fix x ∈ P (xδ). If r(x) = x, then ‖x− xδ‖ < δ/2, while by the definition of δ, ‖x− yδ‖ > δ/2
and thus x /∈ P (yδ). Suppose r(x) 6= x. Since xδ ∈ intC(B), by Property (3) of the set Xδ,
r(x) cannot belong to ∂CB, since in this case the distance between xδ and r(x) is greater
than δ/2. Therefore, r(x) belongs to a face of C. Writing r(x) as x− p, we then have that p
is a normal to a hyperplane containing one of the faces of C and thus p ·yδ 6 p · r(x). Hence,
‖x− yδ‖2 > ‖r(x)− x‖2 + ‖r(x)− yδ‖2 > ‖r(x)− x‖2 + δ2/4 by the definition of δ, while
as we saw in the previous paragraph, ‖x− xδ‖2 < ‖r(x)− x‖2 + δ2/4; thus again x /∈ P (yδ)
and we are done.
For our problem of triangulating Σn ×Θn, we recall the properties that the triangulation
should satisfy: (1) The only vertices in Σn×{ θ0n } of Tn are pure strategies (sn, θ0n), sn ∈ Sn;
(2) letting Θ1n be the face of Θn where θ
0
n has zero probability, if Tn ∈ Tn is a simplex
either with a face in Σn × Θ1n, or shares a face with such a simplex, then the diameter of
Tn is less than ζ; (3) there exists a convex function %n : Σn × Θn → R+ such that: (a)
%n(λx + (1 − λ)y) = λ%n(x) + (1 − λ)%n(y) iff x and y belong to a simplex Tn of Tn; (b)
%−1n (0) = Σn × { θ0n }.
Let Sˆ1n ≡ Sn × { θ0n }; Let Tn be the set of vertices of Θn and Sˆ2n ≡ { s0n } × (Tn \ { θ0n}).
Let Sˆn ≡ Sˆ1n ∪ Sˆ2n \ {(s0n, θ1n)} where θ1n is a vertex of Θn that is different from θ0n. Note that
d ≡ dim(Σn × Θn) = |Sn| + |Tn| − 2 = |Sˆn|. For each sˆ1n ∈ Sˆ1n, let x(sˆ1n) be the unit vector
in RSˆn for the coordinate sˆ1n; for each sˆ2n ∈ Sˆ2n, let x(sˆ2n) be a point in RSˆn to be determined
later, and X ≡ {x(sˆ2n)}sˆ2n∈Sˆ2n .
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Define an affine function FXn : Σn×Θn → RSˆn as follows: for each sˆn ∈ Sˆn, FXn (sˆn) = x(sˆn);
for a vertex (sn, θn) of Σn × Θn that is not in Sˆ1n ∪ Sˆ2n, define FXn (sn, θn) = FXn (sn, θ0n) +
FXn (s
0
n, θn)−FXn (s0n, θ0n). The map FX extends to the whole of Σn×Θn by linear interpolation.
If the collection X ∪ {x(sˆ1n)}sˆ1n∈Sˆ1n is affinely independent (which holds for any choice of
(x(sˆ2n))sˆ2n∈Sˆ2n in an open and dense set of R
d), then FXn is an affine homeomorphism with its
image C(X) ≡ FXn (Σn ×Θn) and the dimension of C(X) is |Sˆn|.
We claim now that the set X can be chosen generically for a Delaunay triangulation of
C(X). In fact, the condition we need is the following: for each collection of distinct vertices
vi i = 1, . . . , 2K with K > 2, of Sn × Tn that do not belong to Sˆ1n,
∑K
i=1 ‖FXn (vi)‖2 6=∑2K
i=n+1 ‖FXn (vi)‖2. To prove the claim, we have to show that the intersection of d+ 2 of the
Voronoi polyhedra is empty. Let v0, . . . vd+2 be d + 2 vertices of Σn ×Θn. The collection of
the vi’s is not affinely independent. In fact, there are an even number of vertices v1, . . . v2K of
the collection such that
∑K
i=1 vi =
∑2K
i=K+1 vi; and of these there are as many vertices in Sˆ
1
n
among the first K as there are in the second, and there is at least one vertex on each side of
the equality that does not belong to Sˆ1n. Therefore,
∑K
i=1 ‖FXn (vi)‖2 =
∑2K
i=K+1 ‖FXn (vi)‖2,
which contradicts our assumption given that vertices in Sˆ1n have norm one. Thus C(X) has
a Delaunay triangulation for generic X.
Take now a generic set X with the property that the norm of xsˆ2n is strictly greater than
one for sˆ2n ∈ Sˆ2n. Let B0 = FXn (Σn × Θ1n) and consider a generic hyperplane H = {x ∈
Rd|a · x = b} that separates strictly B from the other vertices of C(X) so that we can
triangulate C(X) using the vertices of C(X) plus those of the polytope B = H− ∩ C(X).
Since FXn is an affine homeomorphism, ‖x− y‖∞ 6 M‖FXn (x)− FXn (y)‖ for some M > 0
and for all x, y ∈ Σn×Θn. Let δ > 0 be smaller than Mζ. Using the construction described
above, we now have a triangulation Tδ of C(X) where each point in intC(B) belongs to a
simplex with diameter less than δ/M , giving us properties (1) and (2) of Subsection 3.10.
As for property (3), if %n is the convex function associated to the Delaunay triangulation Tδ,
the composition %n ◦ FXn is convex and linear precisely on each cell of the triangulation of
Σn × Θn induced by the inverse mapping (FXn )−1 : C(X)→ Σn × Θn. Our convex function
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takes value one on Σn × { θ0n } and is strictly above one elsewhere. Subtracting now 1 from
%n ◦ FXn we have a convex function satisfying property (3).
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